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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This is an appeal of the Utah Court of Appeals’ affirmation of the entry of summary
judgment in favor of Appellee 2010-1 RADC CADC Venture, LLC (“RADC”). As stated
by the Appellants, the issues before this Court are:
Issue I: Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding Appellee 2010-1
RADC/CADC Venture’s claims against Appellant could be deemed to relate back to the
filing of a complaint by another party under the provisions of Rule 15(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue II: Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court’s award
of 100% of the amount due on the note to Respondent 2010-1 RADC CADC Venture
after determining Petitioner’s argument was inadequately briefed.
Standard of Review: The standard of review for both issues is that of correctness,
or de novo, to determine whether the Court of Appeals “accurately reviewed the trial
court’s decision under the appropriate standard of review.” Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, ¶
8, 27 P.3d 538. This Court reviews the issues without deference to the trial court’s legal
conclusions, and considers the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
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most favorable to the non-moving party. R & R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, ¶ 18, 199 P.3d 917, 922.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW
1. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee -- Action to recover
balance due upon obligation for which trust deed was given as security -- Collection of
costs and attorney's fees.
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed
as provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust
deed was given as security, and in that action the complaint shall set forth the
entire amount of the indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed, the
amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market value of the
property at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the
fair market value of the property at the date of sale. The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's
fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In
any action brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred.
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). Relation back of amendments.
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the
original pleading.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RADC is collecting the deficiency judgment following foreclosure of a loan in the
amount of $2.5 million. Utah First Federal Credit Union (“Utah First”) timely filed the
deficiency action. Appellants, the makers and guarantors of the loan, seek to avoid the
payment of the judgment on procedural grounds, arguing that RADC should have been added
2

as a plaintiff to the deficiency action much sooner than it was. Appellants further argue that
even if RADC’s entry into the lawsuit was timely, Appellants should not have to repay 100%
of the debt to RADC because it only owns a 48% interest in the loan.
There is only one loan at issue. It was secured by one trust deed and it is the subject
of this single deficiency action. The participation agreement determines which participants
are entitled to what percentage of the loan payments. It does not divide the loan in two. It
does not give the Appellants the right to pay 52% to Utah First, and 48% to RADC. Rather,
Appellants are obligated to repay the loan. The loan obligation, and the relationship of the
parties is illustrated as follows:

The matter was presented to the district court on dispositive motions for summary
judgment filed by Utah First, RADC, and Appellants. The district court denied the motions
filed by Utah First and Appellants but granted the motion filed by RADC. (R. 826-838.) In
connection with Utah First’s voluntary dismissal of its claims, the Court entered final
judgment for the entire deficiency against the Appellants. (R. 936-939; see also R. 991-993,
and 1097-1101.) Appellants first appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling
of the district court and now seek review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

In 2007, Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC entered into a business loan

agreement with America West Bank (hereinafter “Loan Agreement”). (See R. 827; see also
copy of Loan Agreement at R. 768.) A courtesy copy of the Loan Agreement is attached as
Addendum A.
2.

The Loan Agreement states that the Lender may “sell, transfer, assign or grant

participations in all or any part of the loan. . . .” (R. 768.) The Loan Agreement also states,
“Borrower further . . . unconditionally agrees that either lender or such purchaser may
enforce borrower's obligation under the loan irrespective of failure or insolvency of any
holder of any interest in the loan.” (R. at 771.)
3.

The amount of the Loan was $2,500,000.00 (hereinafter the “Loan”). (See R.

827; see also copy of Note at R. 774.)
4.

The Roland Neil Family Limited Partnership, Roland Walker, and Sally

Walker, each personally guaranteed the Loan. (See Personal Guarantees, R. 776-778.)
5.

On December 6, 2007, America West Bank entered into a loan Participation

Agreement (hereinafter “Participation Agreement”) with Utah First Federal Credit Union
(hereinafter “Utah First”), wherein Utah First became a participant in the Loan with an
undivided 52% interest, and America West Bank retained an undivided 48% interest. (See
R. 827; see also Participation Agreement, R. 555-559. A courtesy copy of the Participation
Agreement is attached as Addendum B.)
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6.

On or about November 13, 2007, Utah First sent a letter to Defendant Roland

Walker, informing him that, prior to closing the loan, Utah First had purchased “a
participation in the loan,” and asking him to sign a membership form to become a member
of the credit union. (See R. 724.) Mr. Walker signed the application and became a member.
(See R. 726-727.)
7.

On December 5, 2008, Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC executed a

Change in Terms Agreement, which restated, modified and extended their promissory note
(hereinafter “Note”) with America West Bank. (See R. 827; see also copy of Change in
Terms Agreement, R. 313.)
8.

The Revolving Credit Deed of Trust (hereinafter “Deed of Trust”) on the real

property securing the Note named America West Bank as beneficiary and trustee. (See R.
827; see also copy of Deed of Trust at R. 317.)
9.

On May 1, 2009, the FDIC closed America West Bank and seized its interest

in the Note. (See R. 827.)
10.

Between May and December 2009, the FDIC sent Dos Lagos multiple letters,

notifying them that their Loan with America West Bank was in default, and requesting
payment. (See R. 827.)
11.

In 2010, the FDIC auctioned and sold America West Bank's interest in the Note

to RADC. (See R. 828.)
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12.

The FDIC subsequently assigned and transferred the Deed of Trust to RADC.

(See R. 828.)
13.

On or about August 26, 2010, Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC were

informed via letter that their Loan had been transferred from America West Bank to RADC.
(See Letter from FDIC, R. 213.)
14.

In the Fall of 2010, a Notice of Trustee's Sale was posted at the property

securing the Note and published in a newspaper of general circulation. (See R. 828.)
15.

On December 3, 2010, a Substitution of Trustee was recorded at the

Washington County Recorder's Office naming Marlon L. Bates as the successor trustee under
the Deed of Trust. (See R. 828.) The Senior Vice President of Utah First signed the
Substitution of Trustee. (See R. 215.)
16.

On December 6, 2010, the property securing the Note was sold at a trustee's

sale (hereinafter “Trustee’s Sale”) for $1,060,000.00 to the highest bidder, who was RADC.
(See R. 828.)
17.

The value of the property securing the Note was $1,510,000.00 at the time of

the Trustee's Sale. (See R. 828.)
18.

On December 6, 2010, the outstanding payoff balance on the Deed of Trust was

$3,426,701.91. (See R. 828.)
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19.

On January 14, 2011, Utah First filed the subject deficiency action (hereinafter

“Original Complaint”), intending to recover the difference between the entire debt under
the Note and the value of the property. (See R. 1; see also R. 828.)
20.

Utah First was the only plaintiff when the case was first filed. (See R. 1.) Utah

First is not a party to this appeal.
21.

On June 24, 2011, Dos Lagos filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 17(a).

(R. 180.) It argued that Utah First was not the real party in interest because the Loan was
transferred from America West Bank to RADC, who was not named in the Original
Complaint. (See R. 183-203.)
22.

Utah First subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend complaint, along

with a proposed first amended complaint (hereinafter the “First Amended Complaint”). (R.
233.)
23.

The First Amended Complaint proposed to add RADC as a party plaintiff and

indicated that pursuant to a loan participation agreement entered by Utah First and RADC’s
predecessor, America West Bank, Utah First received an undivided 52% interest in the Note,
and America West Bank received an undivided 48% interest. (R. 303-311; See also 426-427.)
24.

The First Amended Complaint indicated that the FDIC auctioned and sold

America West Bank’s 48% undivided interest to RADC. (See R. 303, 305-306.)
25.

On September 7, 2011, Dos Lagos stipulated to allow the First Amended

Complaint. (R. 274-275.)
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26.

The First Amended Complaint was filed on November 15, 2011, adding RADC

to the case as a party plaintiff. (R. 303.)
27.

The Original Complaint mistakenly alleged a total indebtedness of only

$1,819,774.97 as of the Trustee’s Sale. (See R. 3; see also R. 550-551.)
28.

The alleged indebtedness of $1,819,774.97 inadvertently took into account only

Utah First’s 52% interest in the Note, and failed to allege the remaining 48% interest in the
Note. (See R. 550-551.)
29.

When the First Amended Complaint was filed, Utah First and RADC

inadvertently neglected to amend the amount of indebtedness to take into account the other
48% interest in the Note. (See R. 525.)
30.

The indebtedness attributable to Utah First's 52% interest, $1,819,774.97, plus

the indebtedness attributable to RADC' s 48% interest, $1,606,926.94, equaled the actual
payoff balance for the Note in the amount of $3,426.701.91 as of December 6, 2010, the date
of the Trustee’s Sale. (See R. 524 and 833.)
31.

On June 29, 2012, Utah First and RADC filed another motion for leave to

amend complaint along with a proposed second amended complaint (hereinafter the “Second
Amended Complaint”), to amend the total amount of alleged indebtedness to be
$3,426.701.91, the true payoff amount as of the Trustee’s Sale. (R. 502; 626.)
32.

Dos Lagos did not object to the Second Amended Complaint. (R. 836.)

8

33.

The district court granted leave to amend, and the Second Amended Complaint

was filed on September 7, 2012. (R. 633; 635.)
34.

On April 25, 2013, the district court granted RADC’s motion for summary

judgment and awarded RADC the total deficiency amount. (R. at 826, 932, 936.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the amendment adding RADC as a plaintiff
to the deficiency action satisfied the test for relation back under Rule 15(c). The claims were
the same as alleged in the Original Complaint, which was sufficient notice to Appellants that
they were being sued for failing to repay the Loan.
Furthermore, the cases cited by Dos Lagos for the proposition that contractual privity
alone is insufficient to establish an identity of interest for the purposes of relation back, are
all distinguishable. Contrary to those cases, which involve multiple parties and/or multiple
contracts, Dos Lagos and the other defendants signed one loan which was subject to
foreclosure and collection by either of the participant lenders. The judgment awarded to
RADC is the deficiency, the difference between the debt owed on the Note and the fair
market value of the property. The procedure in arriving at the judgment in favor of RADC
did not create two debts owed to two parties. The addition of RADC as a party plaintiff did
not prejudice Dos Lagos because it relates back to the filing date of the Original Complaint
under Rule 15(c).
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Next, Appellants argue that judgment should not have been entered in favor of RADC
for the entire amount because RADC only holds a 48% interest in the loan. The Court of
Appeals correctly held that Appellants failed to fully brief this issue. Indeed, Appellants
concede that even now they have no legal authority to support their position. RADC is the
only judgment creditor for the full deficiency. Dos Lagos is not prejudiced where it is
obligated to repay the entire debt, regardless of which participant is pursuing it. By entering
the Loan Agreement, Dos Lagos agreed that the involvement of a participant would not
affect its liability under the Note or Deed of Trust. The complaint has always sought the
deficiency for the unpaid Note. Defendants have been on notice since the initial pleading
that that was the relief sought.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ADDITION OF RADC AS A PARTY RELATES BACK TO THE

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT.
After filing its deficiency action, Utah First added RADC as a party-plaintiff in
response to Appellants’ motion to dismiss, which alleged that Utah First was not the real
party in interest. (See R. 180.) Appellants’ premised their motion on the idea that they were
prejudiced by the omission of RADC. (See R. 183-203.) Appellants then stipulated to allow
Utah First to add RADC as a plaintiff. (R. 274-275.)
Although the filing of the First Amended Complaint occurred more than three months
after the foreclosure sale, it related back to the filing of the Original Complaint pursuant to
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Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(c) provides for the amendment of
pleadings so long as the facts and claims in the amended pleading arise out of the same
transaction or set of circumstances which gave rise to the original pleading. See URCP 15(c).
A core purpose of Rule 15 is to allow “a plaintiff to cure defects in his or her original
complaint despite the intervening running of a statute of limitations.” Russell v. Standard
Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). While Rule 15(c) does not expressly
apply to amendments adding a party to the case, this Court has extended the rule to
amendments where there is an “identity of interest” between the parties. Wright v. PK
Transport, 2014 UT App 92, ¶ 5, 325 P.3d 894.
A. Appellants are not Prejudiced Where the New Party is Pursuing the
Same Debt.
The “identity of interest” standard is designed to protect unknowing parties from
being added to litigation after the applicable statute of limitations has passed. This exception
was first set forth in Utah in Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). In
Doxey-Layton, this Court explained that the “exception operates . . . when new and old
parties have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or proved the relation back is not
prejudicial.” Id. The exception avoids the “mechanical use of a statute of limitations” to
prevent adjudication of a claim. Id.1 The Doxey-Layton court further explained that this
1

This exception has been explained in the federal context as follows: “As long as
defendant is fully apprised of a claim arising from specified conduct and has prepared to
defend the action, defendant's ability to protect itself will not be prejudicially affected if a
new plaintiff is added, and defendant should not be permitted to invoke a limitations
11

exception is valid in cases where the real parties in interest are “sufficiently alerted to the
proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early stage.” Id. As noted with
regard to the federal corollary to Utah’s Rule 15(c), “[n]otice is the critical element involved
in Rule 15(c) determinations.” Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236-237 (5th Cir.
1968).
In the wake of the Doxey-Layton opinion, courts have employed a two-part test to
determine the applicability of the identity of interest exception to the statute of limitations.
To satisfy the first prong of the test, one must show the claims alleged in the amended
pleading arise out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence” described in the original
pleading. Wright v. PK Transport, at ¶ 5; Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 237, ¶ 43, 239
P.3d 308; Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC, v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App 173, ¶ 48, 355
P.3d 1047; Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App 354, ¶ 32, 101 P.3d 371.
The second prong requires that one establish that the added party had either actual or
constructive notice “that it would have been a proper party to the original pleading such that
no prejudice would result from preventing the new party from using a statute of limitations
defense” they could have used otherwise. See id.
Both elements are present in this case. While the Original Complaint was amended
at times to clarify parties and dollar amounts, the core facts remained the same. The

defense.” 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil, 3d, § 1501 at 212–22 (2010) (analyzing the applicability of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)).
12

complaint and its subsequent amendments only ever sought to collect the deficiency on the
Note from the Appellants in the wake of the foreclosure of the Trust Deed. As an interest
holder in the Loan, RADC was a proper party to the original proceeding. The Participation
Agreement expressly gave Utah First the right to direct the collection of the debt. (R. 555559; see also Addendum B.) Utah First initially pursued the deficiency action in its own
name, but then added RADC in response to Appellants’ motion to dismiss. Appellants were
not prejudiced by the addition of RADC under these circumstances. Indeed, Appellants
allowed the amendment because they thought they were prejudiced without RADC as a party.
The Appellants had actual notice that they were being sued for the deficiency from the outset,
thus establishing the required identity of interest. See Ottens, at ¶¶ 43-44.
1.

Appellants Had Sufficient Notice That They Were Defending

the Entire Deficiency.
Both the Court of Appeals and the District Court concluded that there is only one
transaction here. Neither the Original Complaint nor any of its amendments discuss two
notes, two parties or two sets of collateral. There was no attempt to foreclose a percentage
of the collateral or seek a percentage of a deficiency. Indeed, attempting to do so might be
a violation of Utah’s one-action rule. See Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-901. Utah First
commenced and completed the foreclosure while America West Bank was in the throes of
receivership with the FDIC. Appellants had actual knowledge of the Participation Agreement
and they knew about the eventual conveyance of America West Bank’s interest in the loan
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to RADC. (See R. 213 and 724.) In the meantime, Utah First credited the full purchase price
of the property to the outstanding debt in connection with the foreclosure. Consequently,
there is only one interest at issue here. It is the remaining debt after applying the sale
proceeds.
B. Where Two Parties Hold the Same Interest, the “Privity of Contract”
Limitation on Identity of Interest does not Apply.
The Court of Appeals concluded that, “There is perhaps no closer identity of interest
than that shared by two parties who are joint holders of the same note.” 2010-1 RADC/CADC
Venture, LLC v. Dos Lagos, LLC, 2016 UT App 89, ¶13, 272 P.3d 683. Appellants claim this
interest is simply privity of contract and is insufficient for purposes of relation back under
Rule 15(c). This argument misconstrues the “identity of interest” doctrine.
Utah’s appellate courts have held that: “[p]arties have an identity of interest when the
real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them
unofficially, from an early stage.” Sweat v. Boeder, 2013 UT App 206, ¶ 13, 309 P.3d 295.
Appellants cite to Perry v. Wholesale Supply Corp.,681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), which states
that “an ‘identity of interest’ exists where the parties are so closely related in their business
operations that notice of the action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the
other.” Perry at 217 (emphasis added). Almost all of the cases interpreting Rule 15(c) deal
with the addition of party defendants and the analysis of whether or not they had sufficient
notice of the proceeding to deny them their statute of limitations defense. Because RADC
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was added as a plaintiff on the same Note and the same causes of action, and because
Appellants were on notice throughout the process that only one loan was in default and being
enforced against them, the issue of privity of contract does not really apply.
1.

The Cases Cited by Appellants are Distinguishable.

Nevertheless, Appellants cite several cases holding that privity of contract is
insufficient, by itself, to support relation back of an amended complaint adding new parties.
These cases are distinguishable from the present case. Each of the cases concerns the
addition of defendants rather than plaintiffs, which is different from this case, where Utah
First sought to add a co-plaintiff. More importantly, in each case there was no basis to find
that notice of the action to the original defendant(s) equated to notice to the late-added
defendant(s). Based on these and other distinctions, the cases are of little help to Appellants.
In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., a general contractor sued a subcontractor,
Perry, with respect to defective doors. Perry, at 216. Three years after the case was filed, and
after the statute of limitations had expired, Perry filed a third-party complaint, naming the
supplier and manufacturer of the doors as third party defendants. Id. The case was dismissed
pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations and Perry appealed. Id. Relying upon DoxeyLayton, this Court affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that the only relationship between
the parties was contractual. Id., at 217. This Court found that the contracts were insufficient
to establish an identity of interest such that notice of the suit against the subcontractor was
notice to either the supplier or the manufacturer. This stands to reason as the supplier and
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manufacturer were two or three steps removed from the general contractor as shown here:

This diagram is far different from the relationship between Appellants and their
participant lenders. Here, there is only one loan agreement evidenced by one Note and one
Trust Deed. Either of the participant lenders could have foreclosed and pursued the
deficiency. The fact that RADC was added more than three months after the foreclosure sale
changed nothing. Appellants were still being sued for the same debt resulting from the same
foreclosure.
Appellants also cite to Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). In
Russell, plaintiff filed a libel suit against The Associated Press and The Salt Lake Tribune
in response to an article they published which had originated with the Ogden Standard
Examiner. Id. A few months later, plaintiff amended the complaint to add Standard Corp.,
as a Defendant based on the fact that the Standard Examiner was the original publisher of the
article. Id at 264. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint based on the expiration
of the statute of limitations. Id. That decision was affirmed by this Court, which again found
that the simple contractual relationship between Standard Corp., The Associated Press and
The Salt Lake Tribune, allowing each of them to share and publish each other’s stories, was
not enough to show that service of the complaint on the original defendants was sufficient
to notify Standard Corp., of the action. Id. at 265. The relationship between Russell and the

16

publishing companies is illustrated like this:

Three different publishing entities who may or may not publish each others stories does not
create an identity of interest. This case at bar is different than Russell. Here, Utah First and
RADC each have an ownership interest in the same loan. Foreclosure by one constitutes
foreclosure by the other, and repayment of the loan to one constitutes repayment of the loan
to the other, at least as far as the Appellants are concerned.
The final case cited by Appellants is VCS, Inc., v. Utah Community Bank, 2012 UT
89, 293 P.3d 290. In VCS, the plaintiff sued to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. Id., at ¶ 2. VCS,
Inc., initially sued the general contractor but failed to name Utah Community Bank (the
“Bank”) and also failed to file a lis pendens within 180 days as required by statute. Id., at
¶¶ 2, 29. VCS subsequently named the Bank as a defendant in an amended complaint. Id
at ¶ 9. The trial court ultimately dismissed the claim against the Bank, holding that the
mechanic’s lien was void as to the Bank and once again, this Court affirmed that decision.
Id. It is easy to see why in the following diagram, as the Bank was a step removed from VCS.
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As in the other cases, VCS argued that Rule 15(c) saved the late addition of new defendants
by relating the amendment back to the filing of the original complaint, and just as the other
cases, this Court rejected that argument. Id., at ¶¶ 26-29. This Court explained that there was
no “identity of interest” between the owner and the Bank based solely on their contractual
relationship as borrower and lender. Id at ¶¶ 29. This makes sense. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine how a borrower and lender could ever have an identity of interest for the purposes
of relation back under Rule 15(c), as their interests are potentially adverse.
2.

The Case of Highlands at Jordanelle is Also Distinguishable.

Each of the cases cited by Appellants concerns the addition of defendants. RADC has
found only one case in Utah dealing with the addition of a plaintiff under Rule 15(c). The
recently-decided case of Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App
173, 355 P.3d 1047, is illustrative of the applicability of Rule 15(c) when adding a plaintiff
rather than a defendant. In Highlands, a plaintiff, Pigeonhole Development, LLC (“PHD”),
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who had purchased causes of action against the defendants, filed suit on one of its claims as
successor in interest to the original claim holder, Prime West Jordanelle, LLC (“Prime
West”). Id., at ¶ 47. PHD filed its complaint prior to the running of the statute of limitations.
Id. Later, PHD attempted to amend its complaint to add subsequently purchased claims from
a different claim holder, PWJ Holdings, LLC (“PWJ”), once again suing as successor in
interest. Id. The Plaintiff argued that the amendment, though made after the expiration of
the statute of limitations, should relate back to the original complaint. Id., ¶¶ 47-50. The
trial court rejected the argument on the basis that the amendment sought to add a plaintiff,
PWJ, and that PHD, as successor in interest to Prime West, did not share an identity of
interest with PHD as successor in interest to PWJ. Id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding there was no “identify of interest”. Id. The Court
of Appeals applied the two-part test from Ottens and determined that the claims of PWJ did
not arise from the same transaction or occurrence that gave rise to claims in the original
complaint, and therefore, there was no “identity of interest”. Id., at ¶ 51.
Unlike Highlands, which involved two separate claims held by two separate creditors,
there are two participant lenders on the same debt in this case. Appellants’ claims that they
were not on notice that they were facing enforcement of the full debt are without merit.
Appellants were party-defendants at the beginning of the action foreclosing one promissory
note. When the torch to pursue that deficiency action was tossed from one plaintiff to
another, the defendants were never prejudiced.
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II.

THERE IS NO ERROR WHERE THERE IS ONLY ONE NOTE AND

ONE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT: APPELLANTS MUST REPAY THE ENTIRE
DEBT.
Appellants concede they have no legal authority for the argument that all the owners
of a single note, secured by a single piece property must all appear as party-plaintiffs to
collect that obligation and that each owner may only recover his or her respective interest
from the debtor. Appellants suggest that allowing one of the owners to sue on a note without
all of the others creates a windfall, in this case to RADC. There is no windfall. The
Participation Agreement says that if one party receives payment on the loan though a setoff,
that party is required to pay to the other participant its pro-rata share of the payment. (R. at
789, see also Addendum B.) Thus, although RADC is the recipient of the judgment in this
case, RADC is contractually bound to split any amount collected with Utah First.
In reality, Appellants seek a “windfall” through relief from liability to 52% of the
debt. In making its ruling, the Court of Appeals noted the dissonance between Appellants’
claim that the district court’s decision “cited no law” and the lack of any legal authority cited
by Appellants demonstrating that decision was in error. 2010-1 RADC/CADC Venture, LLC
v. Dos Lagos, LLC, ¶21. The Court of Appeals found that the debt at issue stemmed from a
single note, secured by a single piece of property and that following the foreclosure of that
property there remained a single deficiency, owed by Appellants. Id., ¶ 13. The issue of to
whom and in what amounts that debt is ultimately paid is irrelevant to the issue of whether
Appellants owe it.
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Appellants attempt to use the fact that RADC and Utah First share a specified
percentage interest in the loan as evidence that each may only sue for their respective
portions. The argument misconstrues the nature of the Participation Agreement, which
provides as follows:
Participant’s participation hereunder shall be in the form of an undivided 52%
interest in the Loan...provided however the maximum principal amount of
Participant’s participation hereunder shall in no event be in excess of
$1,300,000. Lead Banks participation hereunder shall be in the form of an
undivided 48% interest in the Loan . . . provided however the maximum
principal amount of Participant’s participation hereunder shall in no event be
in excess of $1,200,000. (R. at 787, emphasis added.)
The percentages are undivided, similar to an undivided interest in land shared by co-tenants.
The percentages are used to determine what portion of the loan principal each participant is
obligated to provide as well as for calculation of the division of the payments. While each
participant may sell its respective interest in the loan to other parties, the underlying loan
stays intact as a single obligation to be paid by the Appellants.
Appellants also misinterpret the provision of the agreement which allows a participant
to enforce its agreement independently to mean that it may only sue for and receive judgment
for its respective interest under the note. In cases where, as here, there is real property
securing the note, that property must be foreclosed prior to any suit on the note. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-901. The Participation Agreement allows for one participant to enforce
the debt rather than having to wait for other participants to get on board, which might be
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difficult or impossible if someone cannot be found, or, as happened here, the entity has been
closed by the FDIC and its interests are being sold off. In addition, the Loan Agreement says:
Borrower further . . . unconditionally agrees that either lender or such
purchaser may enforce borrower's obligation under the loan irrespective
of failure or insolvency of any holder of any interest in the loan. (R. at
771, emphasis added).
In the event one participant is unable to enforce the loan against a defaulting borrower, the
other participant is authorized to do so. That is what happened. Utah First, as the majority
interest holder, is also entitled to determine how enforcement of the loan should proceed
following default. (R. at 555-559.) Utah First withdrew from the case and RADC is
proceeding. Regardless of which participant pursues the deficiency, Appellants still owe the
entire debt.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, RADC is entitled to the entire deficiency despite the fact that
Utah First holds a participation interest. The ruling of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed.
DATED October 21, 2106.
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER
Attorneys for Appellee

/s/ Richard C. Terry
Richard C. Terry
Douglas A. Oviatt

22

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief contains approximately 6,218 words in Times New Roman font, size 13.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on October 21, 2016, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following by mailing two hard copies
thereof.
Douglas B. Thayer, USB No. 8109
Andy V. Wright, USB No. 11071
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
3301 North Thanksgiving Way, Suite 400
Lehi, Utah 84043
dthayer@djplaw.com
awright@djplaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER
Attorneys for Appellee
/s/ Richard C. Terry
Richard C. Terry

23

ADDENDUM A
Loan Agreement

ADDENDUM B
Participation Agreement

